(f) It must be borne in mind that capitalist world is not all bad. (e) Conflicts between capitalist states, though likewise fraught with danger for USSR, nevertheless hold out great possibilities for advancement of socialist cause, particularly if USSR remains militarily powerful, ideologically monolithic and faithful to its present brilliant leadership. (d) Intervention against USSR, while it would be disastrous to those who undertook it, would cause renewed delay in progress of Soviet socialism and must therefore be forestalled at all costs.
Smart capitalists, vainly seeking escape from inner conflicts of capitalism, incline toward latter. Wars thus generated may be of two kinds: intra-capitalist wars between two capitalist states, and wars of intervention against socialist world. (c) Internal conflicts of capitalism inevitably generate wars. Greatest of them is that between England and US. These conflicts are insoluble by means of peaceful compromise. (b) Capitalist world is beset with internal conflicts, inherent in nature of capitalist society. Battle between these two centers for command of world economy will decide fate of capitalism and of communism in entire world." "In course of further development of international revolution there will emerge two centers of world significance: a socialist center, drawing to itself the countries which tend toward socialism, and a capitalist center, drawing to itself the countries that incline toward capitalism.
As stated by Stalin in 1927 to a delegation of American workers: (a) USSR still lives in antagonistic "capitalist encirclement" with which in the long run there can be no permanent peaceful coexistence. Part One: Basic Features of Post War Soviet Outlook, as Put Forward by Official Propaganda Machine I apologize in advance for this burdening of telegraphic channel but questions involved are of such urgent importance, particularly in view of recent events, that our answers to them, if they deserve attention at all, seem to me to deserve it at once. (Five) Practical deductions from standpoint of US policy. (Four) Its projection on unofficial level. (Three) Its projection in practical policy on official level. (One) Basic features of post-war Soviet outlook. I hope, therefore, Dept will bear with me if I submit in answer to this question five parts, subjects of which will be roughly as follows: Answer to Dept's 284, Feb 3 involves questions so intricate, so delicate, so strange to our form of thought, and so important to analysis of our international environment that I cannot compress answers into single brief message without yielding to what I feel would be dangerous degree of over-simplification.
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